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The scope of the EU’s development agenda has undergone significant changes over the years and now, 
interalia, includes political objectives and sectoral priorities. In South Asia – a region long overlooked 
by the EU due to its marginal presence in global trade, internal bickering and varying political 
preferences – the EU is now focussed on improving infrastructure and social sectors, in addition to its 
longstanding liberal contributions of assistance in response to natural disasters in the region. The wider 
implications of donor coordination and EU development strategy are subject to much scrutiny and 
debate in South Asia, as this aid is inextricably linked to political preferences. This article evaluates the 
nature of the EU’s development programme in South Asia. It also points to the contradictions that  exist 
within the EU’s larger ideological preferences and actions in its development agenda in South Asia. 
 





Over the years the European Union’s (EU) development cooperation policy has 
undergone significant changes in its reach, pattern and scale. Today the EU and its 
Member States are the major donors of development aid to developing countries, 
contributing more than € 49 billion in 2008, which is equivalent to 0.40% of their GNP, 
and this target is set to reach 0.7% in 2015.1  Much of the aid is provided by Member 
States to others through bilateral arrangements and often the EU is expected to follow 
the guidelines worked out by Member States; yet, the development programmes and 
policies have become indispensible activities of the EU. Their importance has increased 
in view of the EU’s (the Commission acting on behalf of the Member States) substantial 
influence in global economic relations. Significantly, the Maastricht Treaty on the 
European Union that introduced a legal status to the development policy, stresses the 
principles of complementarity (of Member States’ policies, programmes and EC action) 
                                                 
1  <http://europa.eu/pol/dev/index_en.htm>, accessed 14 January, 2012. 
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as well as coordination (between two or more development partners and policies) and 
coherence (operation without contradiction in policies and programmes) to improve the 
effectiveness of the policy, indicating the status EU enjoys in the economic operation of 
European countries.  
The Nature of EU development cooperation policy 
 
The EU’s development cooperation policy often overlaps with its trade policy. The 
objective of the policy is to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and 
to foster ‘sustainable economic and social development,’ ‘smooth and gradual 
integration into world economy’ and to contribute to ‘campaign against poverty” in the 
developing countries. 2 The emphasis on the eradication of poverty was further 
highlighted by the EU along with the UN General Assembly adoption of Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) in 2000. The EU has steadfastly supported the MDGs and 
incorporated them into its development policy. The development policy enables the EU 
to conduct regional agreements, which grant certain privileges alongside humanitarian 
aid, special funds for poverty and eradication campaigns. The EU’s liberal values are 
further evident in measures employed by the EU to achieve this objective. These include 
capacity building, involvement of the private sector and civil society and balance of 
payment or budget support to governments to help meet transitional costs.3  
Notably, the emphasis on core EU values in its external economic policy framework has 
increased over the years, as the EU has added trade and development policies to its 
traditional donor coordination role. The end of Cold War, globalisation and the belief in 
the supremacy of democratic values have prompted the EU to increasingly make use of 
its external policy framework to structure bilateral relations as well as to develop the 
world economy in line with its core values. Indeed the EU sees an improved strategic 
coherence between its aid, trade and development policies. There are instances abound 
of the EU making use of its economic leverage, including suspension of aid to coerce the 
target country to accept EU view points. The 2005 policy statement entitled ‘European 
Consensus on Development’ suggested that sustainable development should include 
good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental 
aspects (clause 7), and put an emphasis on reducing poverty, focussing on the MDGs 
and conducting ‘development based on Europe’s democratic values.’4 
Hence, “economic cooperation,” Commission jargon for new type of development aid, 
aimed at improving the macroeconomic and business infrastructure of countries and 
regions through trade, investment and business promotion schemes is being 
increasingly used by the EU. It is in these ‘new generation agreements’ that the EU’s 
                                                 
2  Treaty on European Union, European Communities (Luxembourg, 1992); Title XVIII, Article 130u. 
This article 130u is renumbered as article 177 (Title XX) in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
3 Communication from the Commission, Regional economic integration efforts, II European Community 
support to integration efforts throughout the developing world, Development, collection,vol.2,06/96-
11/97,<http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/ recueil/en/en13/en131_2.htm>, accessed 14 January, 
2012. 
4  <http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/consensus_en.cfm>, accessed 14 January, 2012; Official 
Journal of the European Union  C 46/1 24.2.2006 EN, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_ 2005_en.pdf>, accessed 14 
January, 2012. 
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political objectives are often apparent; and, since the 1990s most of these agreements 
have come to include EU concerns from human rights to democratic principles to labour 
standards to good governance. In fact the EU has even introduced a novel ‘GSP-Plus’ 
incentive to support ‘sustainable development and good governance’ if a ‘vulnerable’ 
country has signed 16 human rights conventions and at least seven (out of the eleven) 
conventions on environment and governance. In other words, political priorities are 
closely aligned with economic policies. This is also evident in the ‘Country Strategy 
Paper’ (CSP) (2007-2013) that the EU began to develop from 2006 onwards for each 
country, in which the objectives and basis of cooperation are clearly spelt out.  
The examination of the EU’s development approach reveals certain trends. The EU’s 
approach to development is not merely guided by economic considerations; political 
objectives, as observed above, are a clear motivator. Although regional and global 
strategies still exist and support to regional organisations continue, the EU is 
increasingly showing an interest in bilateral agreements. This is perhaps due to a 
realisation of the limitations of adopting sweeping global positions. Bilateral relations 
also better enable the EU to attach preferred values in such relations. 
The EU is increasingly showing interest in aligning itself with national development 
strategies, created by concerned governments and focussing on sectoral priorities. Here 
the emphasis is on effecting structural reforms, rather than on support for independent 
projects. In fact, the 2005 ‘European Consensus on Development’ policy statement 
suggests that developing countries have the primary responsibility for creating and 
enabling a domestic environment for mobilising their own resources, including 
conducting coherent and effective policies (developed in collaboration with non-
governmental bodies) and the EU will align with these national strategies.5 In other 
words, there is increasing emphasis on ‘structural reforms’ in the target country to 
realise the political and economic objectives of the EU. There is now a marked emphasis 
on ‘dialogues’ as a means to structure development cooperation and this often serves to 
achieve  the EU’s political objectives. Dialogues would also imply the negotiations 
keeping in mind the final beneficiaries. This in turn has increased the number of actors 
and stakeholders in the process. Hence, the EU is increasingly involving civil society and 
NGOs in development activity since it believes that wider participation is not only 
helpful in implementation of development policy but is also a constituent part of good 
governance. A focus on good governance has become the main component of EU’s 
development strategy.  
There is an increasing stress on ‘reciprocity’ along the lines of the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) enumerated in GATT/WTO and, declining interest in the GSP scheme based on 
‘Special and Differential Treatment’ (SDT) permitted by GATT/WTO rules under 
‘objective criteria’ (such as level of development). This is in particularly evident in the 
ACP-EC-Partnership Agreement or Cotonou agreement of 2000. Even when formal 
agreements take place,  its benefits are nullified by EU’s counter measures  as could be 
observed in EU multi-lateralised initiative of ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) which 
provided duty-free and quota-free access to the EU’s market for exports from LDCs.6 
                                                 
5  Development/policies., ibid 
6 Gerrit Faber and Jan Orbie, “The New Trade and Development Agenda of the European Union,” 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol.9, No.2, June 2008, pp. 192-207; 
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These measures among others include restrictions on the ground of ‘sensitive’ products 
i.e. primary products of developing countries from having easy entry into EU market 
besides variety of obstacles in the form of NTBs, VERs, etc and EU higher tariff rates 
making exports to Europe prohibitive.  
Closely related to this, there is an increased move  from unilateral trade preferences to 
capacity building, regulatory mechanisms and ‘Aid for Trade’ (AfT) policy (to increase 
trade policy capacity of developing countries including policy making, negotiation, 
public-private networking; enable informed choices; financial institutional reforms, 
improved infrastructure; adjustment assistance etc.) to better integrate with world 
trading systems.7  In this policy trade and development goals are linked and the 
presumed benefit of market mechanisms, such as inclusive growth, a dynamic financial 
market, macro-economic stability and institutional quality are held to be conducive to 
development and at the same time, to multilateralism. In this view, the market values of 
the EU are seen as universally applicable and ultimately beneficial to every country. 
Therefore, the EU finds no contradiction between its stated goals of multilateralism and 
an increasing number of bilateral agreements focussed on the common good, even 
though the latter has led to a significant decrease in the number of unilateral concession 
agreements. At times its preferred version of development has faced the problem of 
getting converted into agreement because of the political sensitivities involved. 
Nevertheless, the number of bilateral agreements conducted by the EU has increased 
along with the EU’s attempt to progress the global approach to issues. 
 
EU South Asia Development cooperation 
 
The countries of South Asia were basically former colonies of the British Empire and the 
association with Britain continued even after their independence. This, however, did not 
prevent South Asian countries from establishing closer relations with other European 
countries despite the EC’s initial focus on Africa. In fact, India was one of the first 
countries to establish diplomatic relations with the six members of the EEC in 1962. 
Countries of South Asia, in particular India and Bangladesh, were the major 
beneficiaries Food Aid Convention in 1967 approved by the EEC.8 The first programme 
of financial and technical assistance to non-associated developing countries in 1976 to 
meet cost of food aid and rural development was also beneficial to South Asia.9  
Nevertheless, it was the GSP provisions, which the by EC evolved in 1971 that became 
the framework for the EC’s trade relationship with most developing countries outside 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://europa.eu/pol/dev/index_en.htm; Christopher Stevens, “The EC and the third world,” in D. Dyker 
(ed.), The European Economy. London, Longman. 1992. pp. 211-229. 
7  <http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/trade/aid-for-trade_en.cfm>, accessed 
15 January, 2012. 
8  Under the food aid convention during the period 1970-74, India and Bangladesh became the top 
recipients of EEC’s aid with 6.5 % and 6.4 % respectively of the total aid committed. See, F. Birocchi, “The 
European Union’s Development Policies towards Asian and Latin American Countries,” DSA European 
Development Policy Study Group, Discussion Paper No. 10, February 1999, <www. 
Edpsg.org/Documents/DP10.doc>, accessed 15 January, 2012. 
9 http://aei.pitt.edu/4174/01/001630_1.pdf 
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the ACP including South Asia. The inclusion of Britain in the EC brought countries of 
South Asia, in particular India, closer to EC countries. The first agreement with India 
was signed in December 1973. In June 1981 this  developed into an agreement for 
commercial and economic cooperation ; trade issues dominated without prescribing any 
conditions , such as the implementation of specific policies. Therefore, in the initial 
stages the EC, with a limited number of members and without global ambitions, 
extended humanitarian assistance and economic benefits came without any conditions 
attached, although it cannot be denied that Cold War politics did influence some of its 
choices, especially in East Asia.  
However, in the late 1980s changes in both the European and the global situation, such 
as the signing of the Single European Act and the creation of the Common Market,  the 
end of Cold War and Soviet disintegration, changes in East Europe and its inevitable 
ramifications on the EC, faster economic progress in South East Asia, to name a few, 
influenced the EC’s relation with rest of the world. The new role that EC assumed in the 
changed situation was also reflected in the nature of development cooperation with 
developing countries. With the apparent triumph of liberal democracy and market 
forces, the EC was now bent on reclaiming its global influence, which had been limited 
during the Cold War period and advancing the values dear to its heart. Therefore, a 
sustained position was now seen as necessary. The EC now began to work closely with 
the IMF and the World Bank as well as with its own Member States like France, Britain 
and Germany who were determined to have a rule-based regulatory global mechanism 
for market operation. 
The EU was now determined to increase its presence as well as visibility in fast growing 
Asia. This was visible in its policy documents. For instance, the 1992 Council regulations 
(EEC) extended financial and technical assistance and economic cooperation to Asian 
countries but not without losing sight of its political preferences - promotion of human 
rights, democratisation and good governance along with trade liberalisation and 
strengthening cultural dimension.10 The growing strength of Asia was now recognised 
and the desire of the EC to strengthen its presence in the region was further evident in 
its “Towards a new Asia strategy,” formulated in 1994, which advocated a pro-active 
policy in Asia and foresaw advantages in associating with Asia as well as in helping them 
“to integrate to the open, market based world trading system.” 11 South East Asia was its 
area of focus but at the same time it held that “there are signs that South Asia too could 
enjoy higher economic growth in next ten years, especially if the momentum of 
restructuring is maintained.” 12 The growing importance EU now attached to Asia was 
further evident in its revised strategy in 2001 which was formulated against the 
backdrop of South East financial crisis of 1997, WTO reforms, the EU’s deeper 
integration, accelerating economic development in India, and nuclear tension between 
India and Pakistan. The strategy paper noted the South Asian problems relating to 
                                                 
10  Council regulation(EEC) No.443/92 of 25 February 1992 on Financial and Technical Assistance to, and 
Economic Cooperation with, the developing countries in Asia and Latin America. 
11  “Communication from the Commission to the Council,” Towards a New Asia Strategy, COM (94) 314 
final, Brussels 13-07-1994. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/asem_process/ 
com95. htm>, accessed 15 January, 2012. 
12 Ibid. 
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Kashmir issue, terrorism, and religious fundamentalism and it called for restoration of 
democracy in Pakistan.  
Significantly it felt the need to prepare a comprehensive economic and commercial 
treaty towards South Asia, increase dialogue on trade and liberalisation and policy 
reform among others.13 This was realised in five cooperation agreements that the EU 
signed with five countries of South Asia between 1994 and 2004; but, as outlined in the 
‘EU-SAARC (member countries) partnership and development cooperation agreements’ 
the basis of all agreements (in South Asia) was the ‘respect for human rights and 
democratic principles’ though treaties aimed to ‘enhance and develop two-way trade and 
promote investment, improve economic, technical and cultural links, support overall 
sustainable development and protect the environment.’14 So, the EU has sought to 
develop a multi-faceted relationship with South Asian countries but not without its clear 
political priorities. 
Notwithstanding, the EU-South Asian relations at the bilateral level have steadily 
grown. But the nature of relationship has varied across the region. For instance, the EU 
has a closer relationship with India than other South Asian countries. India is both a 
donor and recipient of EU FDI with EU investment of € 3.0 billion (2010) in India and 
Indian investment of € 0.6 billion in EU. India and Pakistan happen to be major trading 
countries with the EU with 13.8% and 12.4% of imports and 18.7 % and 22.6 % of 
exports respectively in 2010.15 But, the overall statistical figures suggest that while in the 
extra-EU trade South Asia’s share is less than 2 %, the EU’s position in South Asia’s 
external trade is over 20 %. In other words, the EU is extremely important to the 
countries of South Asia but in terms of trade the reverse is not true.. But EU-South 
Asian relations have moved beyond pure commercial transactions. The relationship 
between the EU and South Asia is multi-layered, despite South Asian countries 
complaining about the EU’s high level of community-wide standards, coupling non-
economic issues like human rights with trade issues, subsidies to EU farmers far beyond 
the WTO prescription, the EU’s complicated business procedures; and, on the other 
hand, the EU’s issues with highly regulated markets, NTB’s in the form of import 
licensing, lengthy customs procedures which pose barriers to trade in South Asia.16 
                                                 
13  “Communication from the Commission,” Europe and Asia: A strategic framework for enhanced 
cooperation, COM (2001) 469 final, Brussels,04-09-2001.  
14  The aim of development cooperation in South Asia was stated to be ‘sustainable development and social 
progress.’ But it also included large number of other cooperation areas apart from trade and economic 
cooperation and science and technology cooperation -  creating favourable climate for investment(with 
India, Nepal and Sri Lanka); expand industrial production base (India and Pakistan); protection of 
intellectual rights (India and Sri Lanka); Information, culture and communication( Pakistan and 
Bangladesh); Energy(India, Pakistan and Nepal), prevent drug and money laundering( Pakistan and 
Bangladesh); and, Tourism (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/ relations_with_third_countries/ 
asia/r14102_en.htm>, accessed 15 January, 2012. 
15 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creatingopportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/india> and  
<http://trade.ec.euroopa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/September/tradoc_113431.pdf>, accessed 15 January, 
2012. 
16  <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral relations/countries/>, accessed 15 
January, 2012. 
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Therefore, the numbers of bilateral agreements have gone up and revised agreements 
are being replacing the earlier ones. For instance, the first of these agreements was 
concluded with India in 1973 followed by Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The EC 
concluded three agreements with India, one for each generation (1973, 1981, 1994) and 
each of these was more comprehensive than the preceding ones. Pakistan conducted a 
second generation agreement in1986 and finalised its third generation agreement in 
2001, which entered into force in 2004. Sri Lanka went directly from a first generation 
agreement in1975to a third generation Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and 
Development (CAPD) agreed in 1994 and effected in 1995. Nepal, a late comer went 
straight to a third generation cooperation agreement in1996. The second generation 
agreement with Bangladesh (1976) was replaced by the third generation cooperation 
agreement (2001) that included dialogue on development, trade and governance issues. 
Fully-fledged formal cooperation agreements with Bhutan and the Maldives are yet to 
be concluded although these countries have been receiving development assistance from 
the EU. 
These agreements and the dealings of the EU with South Asia, however, are not solely 
based on economic considerations and the politics of the time had significant impact on 
them. For instance, although Pakistan negotiated a third generation agreement in 1998 
its acceptance was postponed till 2001 for political reasons:  the nuclear test of 1998, 
Kargil war, and the military takeover in 1999. Only after Pakistan changed its policy on 
Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 and joined the ‘war against terror’ was the third 
generation agreement concluded. Similar delays occurred in the acceptance of the 
Country Strategy Paper (CSP) due to EU adverse report on electoral flaws in the general 
elections of October 2002 in Pakistan.17 Conversely, Pakistan was rewarded by being 
included in the list of GSP drug regime countries which were entitled to additional trade 
preference and it was clearly guided by foreign policy considerations after Pakistan 
changed its Afghan position in the aftermath of 9/11. Similarly, Sri Lanka became the 
only Asian country and one of only 15 countries to benefit from a social incentive system 
when the European Commission granted it  GSP Plus status in 2005 (under which 
unilateral beneficiaries of other EU’s Asia-wide programmes such as Asia Invest, Asia 
Urbs, Asia Pro Eco, Asia IT & C and Asia Link.18 
Nevertheless, the objective of the EU in South Asia, as in other regions, is to make 
development more inclusive and to deepen the structural reforms including better 
governance and infrastructure. But the Western notion of governance would not be 
complete without a civil society component. Hence, along with support for government 
activities, support to civil society activities and evolving ‘political dialogues’ are 
constituent parts of the EU’s approach in South Asia. These are perceptible in CSPs and, 
particularly evident in the action plan (as in the case of India). Moreover, in South Asia, 
it is difficult to separate the EU’s development aid from economic cooperation as the 
objectives often overlap.trade concessions are granted to developing countries that ratify 
                                                 
17  Jean-Luc Racine, ‘European Union and South Asia : An appraisal,’ August 2003,  <http:// 
celas.ehess,fr/ docannexe.php?id=1055>, accessed 15 January, 2012. 
18  European Commission, Strategy paper and  indicative programme for multi-country programmes in 
Asia  2005-2006. 
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and implement 27 international conventions on core human rights, labour rights and 
conventions on environment and good governance principles).19   
In other words, the development cooperation policies of the EU in South Asia served 
two purposes. First, it helped to maintain linkages and to ensure a presence in an area 
that is prominently emerging on the world scene for a number of reasons. Second, the 
EU’s development policies in South Asia advanced its core values. However, in practice, 
each agreement had to be country specific because of the sensitivities and specific 
conditions in South Asia and also because of the bilateral problems in the region that 
prevent the implementation of regional strategy. It is here that the bilateral agreements 
that the developed with each country were important, as they indicated both the level of 
EU relations with that country, and the priorities and areas of cooperation. In addition 
to this South Asian countries like other Asian countries were  
 
EU and South Asian Development Cooperation  
 
All South Asian countries have enjoyed close cooperation with the EU and all the major 
beneficiaries of EU assistance. But the nature of the relationship is varied. The EU’s 
relationship with India is deep and has concluded a variety of agreements with many EU 
countries. A regular political dialogue was started at the first Summit of 2000. Since the 
2004 Summit this dialogue has taken the form of a Strategic Partnership, making India 
one of the EU’s select six global partners. The 2005 Joint Action Plan (JAP), revised in 
2008 to implement the multi-dimensional EU-India Strategic Partnership that commits 
both parties to strengthen dialogue, deepen pluralism, democracy, regional cooperation, 
fight against terrorism, and encourage people to people contact It also calls for 
cooperation in S &T, ICT, Transport, Environment and Climate Change, Civil Aviation, 
Security dialogue, Economic Development, Energy, Trade and Investment etc. India – 
the EU have also found new platforms of dialogue through Indian membership of the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the EU’s observer status at SAARC summits. This 
multi-faceted agreement is in contrast to the relations of Bhutan and the Maldives who 
are yet to conclude comprehensive bilateral agreements with the EU. 
The EU has responded positively whenever South Asian countries are affected by 
natural disasters. For instance, Sri Lanka was provided with humanitarian assistance of 
€ 95 million in 2005-06 under the Tsunami Indicative Programme of the Commission 
(May 2005) to overcome the effects of 2004 Tsunami. This was also the case with the 
Maldives who received € 20 million as post-tsunami humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance. The Commission provided assistance of € 98million for relief and 
reconstruction in Pakistan after the October 2005 earthquake in addition to substantial 
assistance through other avenues for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.  
Countries recovering from man-made disasters were also given a helping hand by the 
EU. For instance, much of the assistance to Nepal was structured around post-conflict 
recovery and stability aspects. This is evident in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 
                                                 
19  http://www. Dellka.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_srilanka/trade/gsp.htm, accessed 15 January, 2012. 
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Nepal that earmarked € 120 million (2007-13) in EU assistance for Education (with 
human rights, conflict prevention and good governance as cross-cutting issues), 
Stability and Peace building beside trade facilitation and economic capacity building.20 
These in addition to other packages extended by the EU to Nepal in the form of grants to 
Conflict Mitigation Package I and II, Economic Cooperation and Capacity building 
project (support to SME) etc. The EU was prepared to join hands with the Nepalese 
government’s three year interim plan (2008-10) that focussed on infrastructure, 
economic and social sectors. 
Apart from humanitarian assistance, the EU is actively supporting advancements in the 
social sector. So the EU has prioritised human and  social development  (35 %) in its 
budget allocation to Bangladesh;  its Vulnerable Community Package in Nepal; 
assistance of € 190 million to three major government projects in Pakistan, consisting of 
Social Action Programme (aimed at improving the quality and cost effectiveness of basic 
service delivery in four sectors: elementary education, basic health, reproductive health, 
and rural supply and sanitation); Rural Social Development Programme (aimed at 
enhancing the capacity of local NGOs to complement government efforts in social 
sectors) and Environmental Rehabilitation Project in NWFP and Punjab (aimed at 
increasing capacity of local communities to plan and manage their natural resources in a 
sustainable and economic manner).21  
Governance, capacity building and human rights are the other priority areas for the EU. 
Hence, noting the ‘low absorption capacity’ of Bangladesh government institutions 
(resulting in low level of earlier disbursements) the EU reserved about 25 % of its 
budget for governance and human rights related aspects; support for the Office of the 
High Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR) and Economic Cooperation and Capacity 
Building Project (support for SME). In Nepal, trade and good governance are mentioned 
(including electoral reforms, human rights monitoring and conflict resolution). EU 
support in Sri Lanka focuses on government and capacity building, as it does in Bhutan 
and the Maldives.22 
Environment and conservation of natural resources (Pakistan, Bhutan, the Maldives), 
Rural development (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan), Education (Nepal, Pakistan) 
and support to NGOs (Pakistan) are other areas of cooperation with South Asian 
countries beside trade and economic development. The following table provides an 
overview of the EU development commitment (sector-wise) from 2007 to 2013 mostly 
through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) to the countries of South Asia 
(including Afghanistan) that are also the beneficiaries of other EU thematic 






                                                 
20  <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/nepal/docs/07_13_en.pdf>, accessed 14 January, 2012. 
21  <http://www.delpak.ec.europa.eu/eupakcoop/ecPakDevCoop.htm#Social >, accessed 14 January, 
2012. 
22  See, Country Strategy papers, <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/>, accessed 14 January, 2012. 
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Development Cooperation Assistance to South Asian Countries (2007-2013)* 
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*. Compiled by the author from different Country Strategy Papers, Multiannual Indicative Programmes 
(MIP), MTR Document Regional Strategy for Asia 2007-2013 and Mid-term Review Documents. Source: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/; http://europa.eu/rapid/: http://finmin.nic.in/reports/AnnualReport2010-
11.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/europaid/where/asia/; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
**. EU assistance during 2007-2010 was directed towards peace building process and poverty reduction; 
the CSP provides for flexible responses.  
 
A noteworthy factor in EU-South Asian relations is that, all countries of South Asia were 
beneficiaries of EU GSP scheme. Two South Asian countries, (Pakistan under the Drug 
regime scheme and Sri Lanka under the social incentive scheme) are the beneficiaries of 
the EU’s GSP plus scheme. Bangladesh is the beneficiary of Trade for Aid (TfA) 
provisions of EU and Nepal and Bhutan along with Bangladesh were entitled for EBA 
benefits. Even the SAARC despite its slow progress has been enabled by the EU to help 
South Asian countries. So the overall focus of the EU in South Asia is on socio-economic 
development in a sustainable manner, but the political priorities of the EU are manifest 
in most of the EU’s cooperation agreements with South Asia. Political developments 
have influenced some of the EU’s support structures. Examples of this include the Rural 
development and natural resource management in Pakistan NWFP and Baluchistan 
(given its geopolitical importance) under the Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007-
10) and support to Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 
Another significant factor in the EU’s activities in South Asia is the increasing focus on 
politically relevant issues like human rights, governance, capacity building and related 
issues, which extend beyond traditional aspects like poverty alleviation programmes, 
rural development and health. Equally important is the EU’s stress on structural 
reforms and its increasing alignment with government (sectoral) policies rather than 
assisting specific projects. The implications of assistance are well established and 
assistance has evolved from a project-based project approach to a sectoral approach (in 
collaboration with government).  
This new approach is particularly apparent in the EU’s dealings with India. India is a 
major trade partner and India itself is becoming an active player in the global 
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development scene and is both a donor (under “Indian Development and Economic 
Assistance Scheme – IDEAS) and a recipient of development assistance. Closer 
cooperation between India and the EU has led to negotiations since 2007 on the 
creation of the free trade pact envisaged in the Global Europe Strategy (2006). EU’s 
several agreements with India on diverse development related issues, ranging from 
gender, health, environment to human rights and governance to areas of mutual interest 
such as education, scientific programmes and culture is in itself a recognition of the 
growing importance of India.  
However, the EU intends to move from discrete projects to a sector budget support 
programme approach. This seeks to provide a certain coherence and direction in EU 
support to its other developmental partners. Hence, the CSP for India (2007-13) with a 
budget of about € 210 million wishes to move the present pattern of development 
assistance to pro-poor ‘sector reform’ policies. In other words, the focus is on ‘structural 
reforms’ for increased economic growth that in turn would reduce poverty as well as 
facilitate better economic cooperation. So the EU’s support on priority basis to the social 
sector (health and education) and support to economic, academic, civil society and 
cultural activities as foreseen in the Action plan 23 appears to be guided by the EU’s new 
logic of development. This is best seen in the examples of EU action in the Indian social 
sector where the EU has joined hands with Indian programmes – Sarva Shiksha 
Abhiyan (SSA) and National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) – and seeks to effect 
changes across the sector, rather than within specific projects. 
Therefore, the whole direction of EU development cooperation centres on twin 
principles of pro-poor sector reform and development. This is supplemented by 
dialogues and exchanges in diverse areas – Economic, Civil Society, Culture, Education 
etc. In addition, the Commission also intends to pursue ‘thematic interventions’ in the 
areas of democracy and human rights, migration and asylum, human and social 
development (including capacity building.)24 Support is extended in critical sectors and 
sectoral cooperation occurs with individual states in India. For instance, with the state 
of Chhattisgarh (with budget of about € 160 million for 2006-12) the EU has entered 
into a partnership programme for improving the efficiency of critical social services 
(health and education) and poverty reduction of tribal communities through 
environmentally friendly economic strategies, and with the state of Rajastan the 




The EU’s development approach in South Asia (with the exception of humanitarian 
assistance during natural disasters) is becoming much more specific and refined and 
contains clear economic and political objectives. The development of South 
Development with structural reforms is actively encouraged as this approach are 
perceived to enhance economic prosperity. The stronger countries in South Asia, such as 
                                                 
23  <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/csp/07_13_en.pdf>, accessed 14 January, 2012. 
24  Ibid. 
25  <http://www.delind.ec.europa.eu/dc-sgi-nrm.asp?links=sgi-link4>, accessed 14 January, 2012. 
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India have a greater capacity to achieve this, and different levels of cooperation are 
being worked out with the various countries of South Asia. Nevertheless, the overall 
focus of the EU in South Asia, is to build up the capacities of recipient countries and to 
facilitate their ‘smooth integration into the global economy’ with due consideration to 
certain values perceived to be universal by the EU. 
However, the logic of EU’s approach to development is not universally accepted in most 
South Asian countries. In these countries the word ‘development’ itself has vastly 
differing connotations and implications. The main bone of contention is that unbridled 
integration with the world economy is no guarantee for poverty alleviation, as the EU on 
one hand supports anti-poverty measures and on the other hand restricts products from 
developing countries from reaching its market. These policies mean that developing 
countries have to overcome many barriers especially NTBs in their bid to export to 
global or European markets, while western countries continue to protect their producers 
in areas critical to South Asia, such as agriculture and textiles  under the guise of 
‘sensitive products’ or other labels. This approach is supplemented by labour, human 
rights and other social clauses stipulating conditions that make production in South 
Asia extremely untenable. Therefore, the EU’s support for ‘capacity building’ is nullified 
by its counter measures. 
Further, there is also the complaint that EU acts conveniently in many areas that best 
suits its interests. For instance, tariff reductions  (as the EU assured under EBA scheme) 
are concentrated on less tradable commodities excluding for instance, ‘sensitive’  
products such as sugar, rice and initially bananas. Under the EBA scheme the tariff 
bindings in many cases were fixed at level higher than the actual tariff equivalent of 
NTBs (i.e. WTO ‘tariffication’) that applied in the base year of 1986-88. The European 
Union (EU), for example, had set the bindings at about 60% above the tariff equivalent 
of its Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in the late 1980s, defeating the very purpose of 
‘tariffication’.26  Coupled with these measures are the high sanitary and hyto-Sanitary 
standards (SPS), which apply to marine and other food products where conditions not 
only relate to the quality of the product but also the process. This is also the case for 
other areas, for example milk products or even textiles (which affects the stronger areas 
of South Asia) where entry into EU market is made difficult. 
In South Asia most of these products are produced in unorganised sector or by small 
producers. Especially in the absence of high investment, resources and technology, a 
lack of procedural awareness, the higher costs of compliance and specified production 
methods, which are not applicable to their contexts, these rigid prescriptions deter 
exports, as well as having a negative impact on the EU’s development agenda. So the 
sectoral support and export-oriented structures that the EU seeks to create through 
development cooperation is not always compatible with its developmental goals. The 
‘sensitive’ item clause in EU trade vocabulary and the continuing agricultural subsidies 
in Europe gloss over the real spirit of the EU’s development agenda. 
In addition, the granting of economic assistance by the EU based on political 
considerations has also caused dismay among other countries of South Asia. For 
                                                 
26  See J. Amin, ‘WTO and developing countries: Issues and concerns,’ Jadavpur Journal of International 
Relations, Vol.9, 2004-2005, pp. 105-32. 
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instance, the EU’s extension of the GSP Plus drug regime to Pakistan in 2002, which 
significantly benefitted the Pakistani textile sector, upset India. India then legally 
challenged the EU’s decision at the WTO. When the verdict favoured India, the EU had 
to give up its drug support regime and had to instead incorporate it within a broader 
governance framework. Similarly the EU’s support for Pakistan in view of its changed 
Afghan position and its joining the ‘war on terror’ failed to impress India. India 
perceived itself to be the victim of neighbourhood terrorism. The linking of trade issues 
with political issues is seen as an unhealthy trend by many countries in South Asia.  
However, these hiccups in EU-South Asia relations do not undermine the value of the 
development assistance that the EU provides to South Asia. The EU is the principal 
provider of the much required assistance to South Asia, even though other countries are 
capable of providing assistance. The shift from development aid to more commercial, 
non-aid EU activities in South Asia as well as a reasonably good development rate in 
South Asia is likely to improve the overall economic situation in South Asia. Equally 
important is the sensitivity that EU has shown to the unique situation in South Asia. 
Therefore, it would be advantageous to the countries of South Asia to become organised, 
transparent and accommodating in their dealings with the EU and to realise their goals 
of development. At the same time the EU needs to become more flexible in its approach. 
The dialogues already initiated between the two sides can go a long way towards finding 
mutually beneficial perspectives and policies. 
 
